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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case No.
vs.
13816
KIPP PHILLIPS, DENNIS HORN,
and JERRY McCRIGHT,
Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellants appeal from convictions of the crime
of distributing pornographic material pursant to Utah
Code Ann. § 76-10-1204 (Supp. 1973), by the Second Judicial District Court, Weber County.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Each of the appellants was separately charged and
found guilty of distributing pornographic material in
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Ogden City Court (R-14, 15)*. Thereafter, the cases
were consolidated on appeal to the Second District Court,
Weber County, where the sole issue was the constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1204 (Supp, 1973). The
Court, through the Honorable Calvin Gould, held that
the section in question was constitutional and that each
of the appellants was guilty as charged (R-49).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent prays that the convictions of the lower
court be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Appellants were convicted of a Class "B" misdemeanor and sentenced to pay a fine of $299.00 in the
Ogden City Court for distributing pornographic material,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1204 (Supp. 1973)
(R-3). Each of the appellants appealed their conviction
to the Second Judicial District Court, Weber County
(R-17). Appellants stipulated on said appeal that the
publications entitled Pole & Hole, Climax and Love
Thirsty, respectively, were purchased by Ogden City
police officers from the named appellants at the Adult
Book and Cinema Store in Ogden (R-143). These publications are part of the record before this court. Appellants further stipulated that the only issue before the
*The Record references cited are to the Kipp Phillips file,
Second Judicial District Court, Weber County, Crim. #10941,
which is identical for purposes of this appeal to the files of the
other two appellants.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3
trial court was the constitutionality of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-10-1204 (Supp. 1973) and conceded that if said section was held to be constitutional their convictions should
be affirmed (R-144).
Appellants (R-51-133; 43-48) and respondent (R-2044) having filed memoranda in support of their respective
positions, the Honorable Calvin Gould held that the statute was constitutional and each of the appellants guilty
as charged (R-49).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
OBSCENITY IS NOT SPEECH AND IS NOT
PROTECTED BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT.
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . ."
Relying upon social and legal history, the United States
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that "obscene" speech
or writing is not protected by the constitutional guarantees of the First Amendment. Roth v. United States, 354
U. S. 473, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1498 (1957); Miller v. California,
413 U. S. 15, 93 S. Ct. 2607 (1973); and other cases. The
reasoning of the court in Roth was that because obscenity
is devoid of any value, it should not be considered speech
ait all, and thus need not be afforded constitutional protection.
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POINT II.
UTAH'S STATUTE MEETS THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT.
Prior to June, 1973, the leading obscenity decision
of the United S t a t e Supreme Court was Roth v. United
States 354 U. S. 476 (1957). The Roth Court cited witih
approval (at p. 487) the definition of obscenity as contained in the American Law Institute Model Penal Code,*
Thereafter, the drafters of the Utah Penal Code, adopted
in 1973, attempted, it has been said, to comply with Roth,
and a later United States Supreme Court decision, A
Book v. Attorney General of Massachusetts, 383 U. S.
413 (1966).** They provided in Utah Code Ann. (1953)
§ 1203(1) (1973 Supp.) the definition of pornography***
as follows:
"(1) Any material or performance is pornographic if, considered as a whole, applying
contemporary community standards;
(a) Its predominant appeal is to prurient interest; and
(b)

I t goes substantially beyond customary

*ALI, Model Penal Code § 207.10(2) Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957.
**Loren Dale Martin, Utah Criminal Code Outline, Utah Law
Law Enforcement Planning Agency (1973), pp 232-234.
***The terms "obscentity" and "pornography" appear to be
used interchangeably by the courts, commentators, and legislatures.
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limits of candor in the description or representation of nudity, sex, or excretion."
This section is the heart of appellants' constitutional
challenge.
In June, 1973, the Supreme Court, in a series of
decisions beginning with Miller v. California, 413 U. S,
15 93 S. Ct. 2607 (1973), formulated "concrete guidelines
to isolate 'hardcore' pornography from expression protected by the First Amendment." Id. ai 29. Miller requires that for legislation to constitutionally regulate
obscenity the legislation must only prohibit works which:
1. " depict or describe sexual conduct . . .
specifically defined by the applicable state law,
as written or authoritatively construed (emphasis added)." Id. at 2615.
2. "taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient
interest in sex [and] portray sexual conduct in
a patently offensive way . . ." Id. set 2615.
3. ". . . and which . . . do not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value."
Id. at 2615.
A. The Utah Statute Defines Prohibited Sexual
Conduct In Such A Way As To Give "Due
Process"
"Notice.
The first element of Miller requires that the proscribed sexual conduct be defined, either by statute or
by judicial construction, with enough specificity to give
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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a parson wishing to comply with the law that notice inherent in the concept of due process. The degree of
specificity required was stated in Roth as follows:
"This court, however, has consistently held a
lack of precision is not itself offensive to the
requirements of due process . . . The constitution does not require impossible standards;
All that is required is that the language conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the
proscribed conduct when measured by common
understanding and practices. U.S. v. Petrillo,
[citation omitted] . . . that there may be marginal cases in which it may be difficult to determine the side of the line on which a particular fact situation falls is no sufficient reason
to hold the language too ambiguous to define
a criminal offense. [8 citations omitted] (Emphasis added)" Id. at 1510-1511.
That part of Utah's ifomiulation of the conduct or exhibitions proscribed in § 76-10-1203(1) which reads: "nudity, sex, or excretion" has never been construed by this
Court, although it has been upheld against constitutional
attack by Judges Ziegler and Taylor of the Ogden City
Court and Judge Gould of the Second District Court in
the proceedings below. Appellants calls upon this court
to "authoritatively construe" that language.
1. It is The Duty Of This Court To Hold An
Act Of The Legislature Constitutional If It
Is Possible To Do So.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Appellants do not attack the constitutionality of the
Utah Pornography Statute as applied to the facts of
their cases but only on its fact. Therefore if any sex or
nudity conceivably could be constitutionally proscribed
by this statute, appellants concede they should stand
convicted. Thus, this court is saved the unpleasant duty
of examining the three magazines which are a part of
the record on appeal before it.*
In a 1973 Utah Supreme Court case, State Board of
Education v. State Board of Higher Education, 29 Utah
2d 110, 505 P. 2d 1193, Justice Ellett, concurring, stated:
"Our duty is to hold an act of the legislature valid if it is possible to do so [citing Utah
cases] (emphasis added)."
In the same case, Justice Crockett, also concurring,
stated:
"The presumption of constitutionality
should be indulged . . . "
In a case cited by Justice Crockett in support of the
aforequoted language, Newcomb v. Ogden City Public
School Teachers Retirement Commission, 112 Utah 503,
517, 243 P. 2d 941 (1952), Chief Justice Wolfe, speaking
for the court, stated that the "duty" of the courts was
* Should the court suspect that counsel for appellants conceded too much in limiting this attack to the facial unconstitutionality of the statute, the court need only examine any one of
the three magazines to understand counsel's willingness to concede
their obscentity assuming the statute is valid.
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to hold legislative acts constitutional unless convinced
"beyond a reasonable doubt" that they are unconstitutional. And, in Gubler v. Utah State Teachers Retirement Board, 113 Utah 188, 200, 192 P. 2d 580 (1948),
Justice Latimer stated for the court:
"Every presumption is in favor of the constitutionality of an act of the legislature . . ."
It has even been held that a strained constructioti
is desirable if it is the only construction that will save
TOnstitutionality. In Warren Sanitary Milk Co. v. Board
of Review, 179 N. E. 2d 385, 390 (Ct. Com. Pleas., Ohio),
the court stated:
". . . a strained construction is not only
permissible, but desirable, if it is the only construction that will have constitutionality.
Knights Templar's, etc., Co. v. Jarman, 187
U.S. 197, 23 S. Ct. 108, 47 L. Ed. 139 [and
citing other cases]."
2. Cases Construing Language Similar To Or
Less Specific Than "Nudity, Sex or Excretion.'9
In Miller, the Court expressly left it open for state
courts to add the requisite specificity to state statutes
by judicial construction where the language of the statute
itself was arguably not specific enough. In consequence
of this part of the Miller decision, many state courts
have already "authoritatively construed" their state stat-
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utes. Likewise, a number of federal courts have "authoritatively construed" federal statutes on obscenity. A survey of these cases in the wake of Miller shows that almost all of these sitate and fedaral courts have upheld
the validity of the legislation they examined.
a. State Cases.
On the state level, with the exception of Indiana and
Louisiana, all state courts have upheld the constitutionality of their obscenity statutes against attack that they
did not specifically define the sexual conduct or exhibition sought to be prohibited.
(1) In People v. Hellin, 33 N. Y. 2d 314, 307 N. E.
2d 805 (1973), the Court upheld statutory language
which, like Utah's language, proscribed material if "considered as a whole its predominant appeal is to prurient,
shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, excretion . . .
(Emphasis added.)" In language fully applicable to the
Utah Statute, the court said:
" I t takes no dictionary reference to understand
what the words 'nudity', 'sex', 'excretion' . . .
mean . . . I t is ludicrous and preposterous to
suppose that a person dealing in such material
would not understand the prohibitions here
When sex and nudity, and thg other sorts of
prohibited conduct for that matter, are exploited substantially beyond customary limits
of candor and would, as the average man views
it, be the predominant element in the material
so as to appeal, again predominantly, to las-
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civious cravings, then there can be no doubt
as to what is prohibited. What we are talking
about is hard-core pornography....
Hard-core
pornography consists of 'patently offensive
representations or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated [and/or] patently offensive representation or descriptions of masturbation, excretionary functions, and lewd exhibition of the
genitals'." 307 N.E.2d 813
(2) In People v. Enskat, 33 Cal. App. 3d 900, 109
Cal. Rptr. 433, 438-441 (1973), the California Court of
Appeals noted that the intent of Miller was to strengthen
the psrotabition against obscenity, and that to declare
California's sitatute unconstitutional would run counter
to this. The Court then construed the California obscenity statute,* containing striking similarities to Utah's,
in such a way as to meet the Miller test.
(3) In Price v. Commonwealth,
Va
, 201
S. E. 2d 798 (1974), the court held that to proscribe material, as does Utah, by reference to "nudity, sex, or
excretion" satisfied constitutional requirements, stating:
"We conclude that the Virginia obscenity stat* "Ob scene matter means matter, taken as a whole, the predominant appeal of which to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, is to prurient interet, i.e., a
shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex or excretion; and is
matter which taken as a whole goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in description or representation of such
matters; and is matter which taken as a whole is utterly without
redeeming social importance . . . (emphasis added)." California
Penal Code § 811.
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lite, as construed, prohibits only hard-core pornography such as the examples delineated in
Miller and does not restrict constitutionally
protected speech and writing. We do not believe that the Miller examples were intended to
preempt or standardize state obscentity statutes, for the Supreme Court emphasized that
it was not the court's function to propose regulatory schemes to the states." 201 S.E. 2d 800
(4) In Shton v. Paris Adult Theater J, 231 Ga.
312, 201 S. E. 2d 456 (1973), on remand from tihe United
States Supreme Court, Georgia's highest court held that
the Georgia obscenity statute, which is similar to the
Utah definition of obscenity,* was limited to hard-core
pornography as defined by Miller, and thus was constitutiooal.
(5) Construing a statute** virtually identical to
Utah's, Kentucky's highest court held that it met the constitutional standards of Miller in Hall v. Commonwealth
ex rel. Schroering,
Ky
, 505 S. W. 2d 166 (1974).
(6) In State v. J-R Distributors, Inc., 82 Wash.
2d 584, 512 P. 2d 1049, 1059-1061 (July 27, 1973), the
* "Matter is obscene if considered as a whole, applying contemporary standards, its predominant appeal is to prurient interest, that is, a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion . . . . (emphasis added)." Ga. Code Ann. § 26-2101 (b)
**" 'Obscene' means that to the average person applying contemporary standards the predominant appeal of the matter, taken
as a whole, is prurient interest, a shameful or morbid interest
in nudity, sex or excretion, which goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in description or representation of such
matters." (emphasis added). K.R.S. § 436-101(1)(c)
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court upheld a Washington statute which merely used
the word "obscene" to define the proscribed conduct,
stating at p. 1060:
"We hold that the word 'obscene' as used in
R C W 9.68.010 is not unconstitutionally vague
when considered in the light of the Roth-Miller
test. . . . As thus authoritatively construed by
this court, R C W 9.68.010 is sufficiently definite, when measured by common understanding and practice (emphasis by the court)."
The Washington court then pointed to the authoritative
construction placed by the United States Supreme Court
in the 12-200-F£. Reels case, infra, in "commenting upon
a federal statute using many words similar to those in
RCW 9.68.010." Id., at 1060, note 6.
(7) In Gibbs v. State,
Ark
, 504 S. W. 2d
719 (1974), the defendant contended, as the appellants
in the case at hand, that Miller required that the depiction of sexual conduct sought to be prohibited must be
spelled out in the statute itself.* However, the court
rejected this argument by authoritively construing the
statute to apply only to materials which depict patently
offensive "hard-core" sexual conduct. In so doing, it
stated:
"Also, we are dedicated to the proposition that
"'Arkansas' statute provided merely: " 'obscene' means that
to the average person, applying contemporary standards, the
dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to the
prurient interest/' Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-2730.
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we must give an act a construction that would
meet constitutional tests, if it is reasonably
possible to so do." 504 S.W. 2d 725
(8) In Ebert v. Maryland State Board of Censors,
19 Md. App. 300, 313 A. 2d 536 (1973), the Maryland
Court upheld a state film licensing arrangement whereby
a board of censors was mandated to withhold licensing
from films which are "obscene," construing "obscene" by
reference to the Miller standards of prurience and patent
offensiveness.
(9) In State v. Bryant, 20 N. C. App. 223, 201
S. E. 2d 211 (1973), the court held that a North Carolina statute proscribing the selling of "any obscene writing" satisfied Miller after construing that term in light
of the other elements of the United States Supreme
Court's constitutional test of obscenity.
(10) In State, ex rel. Wampler v. Bird,
Mo.
, 499 S. W. 2d 780, 783-784 (1973), the Missouri obscenity statute was upheld notwithstanding it prohibited
"obscene, lewd and indecent books" without a more
specific description of the conduct or exhibitions sought
to be proscribed, the court construing those words in
light of the prurience and patently offensive elements
of the Miller test.
(11) In Rhodes v. State,
Fla
, 283 So. 2d 351
(Fla. Sup. Ot. 1973), the court held that the Florida
statute met constitutional obscenity requirements although its only definition of obscene material is whether
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the dominant theme of that material appeals to the prurient in/barest.
(12) Finally, the former Texas obscenity statute*
was upheld in West v. State, 16 Cr. L. Rep. 2121 (Tex.
Ct. Crim. App. 1974), wherein the Court held that Miller
authorized the Court to judicially construe the requisite
specificity needed to satisfy constitutional standards.
b. Federal cases.
In United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm
Film, 413 U. S. 123 (1973), a case decided at the same
time as Miller, the court ^considered 19 U. S. C. § 1305(a),
which prohibits the importation of artides which are
"obscene or immoral," without more specific definition.
In sustaining the constitutionality of the section, the
Court through Chief Justice Burger noted that if a "serious doubt" as to vagueness was raised by the use of the
words "obscene;," "lewd," "lascivious," "filthy," "indecent," or "immoral" the Court would interpret these terms
as 'limiting regulated material to patently offensive representations or descriptions of that specific 'hard-core'
sexual conduct given as examples in Miller . . ." Id., 130,
note 7. See also United States v. One Reel of Film, 481
F. 2d 206, 209-210 (1st Cir. 1973), also upholding the
constitutionality of 19 U. S. C. § 1305(a), referred to in
the 12 200 Ft. Reels case.
*" 'Obscene' material means material . . . which is patently
offensive because it affronts community standards relating to the
description of sexual matters. . . ." Art. 527, Vernon's Texas
Codes Ann., Penal (repealed January 1, 1974).
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In United States v. Thevis, 484 F. 2d 1149 (5th Cir
1973), the Fifth Circuit Court, relying on the 12 200
Ft. Reels case, upheld the ronstitutijonality of 18 U. S. C.
§ 1462, which defined materials sought to be proscribed
from interstate commerce in no more specific terms than
"obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy."
B. The Utah Statute Meets the Other Elements of the United States Supreme Court
Obscenity Test.
1. "Patently Offensive" Formulation.
Appellants contend that because Utah Code Ann.
(1953), § 76-10-1203 (Supp, 1973) fails to use the exact
language they allege is required to meet minimum elements of Miller it is consitituitionally infirm. In other
words, they complain that the drafters of § 76-10-1203(1)
did not have the prescience to use the same language
which would appear in Miller six months later. A similar
attack was made upon Utah's prior obscenity statute in
Gordon v. Christenson, 317 F. Supp. 146 (D. Utah, 1970)
and expressly rejected. Chief Judge Lewis spoke for a
three judge court in Gordon as follows:
Since the Utah statute does not conform
exactly with the present tripartite test as enunciated in A Book Named "John Cleland's
Memoirs of a Woman of Plaesure" v. Attorney General of Com. of Massachusetts, 383
U.S. 413, the issue is whether a criminal obscenity statute must expressly incorporate all
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Supreme Court decisions defining obscenity
in order to be valid. W e hold that it need not.
All that is required is that a statute give adequate notice and warning of what conduct is
prohibited. The Utah statute accomplishes this
since it contains the essential ingredients of the
present constitutional standard for obscenity
as reflected in judicial interpretations pertaining to creative art.
Other than giving notice, the inclusion of
any definition of the word "obscene" within
the statute is unnecessary. The constitutional
definition as enunciated by Memoirs and other
decisions is automatically and impliedly included within the Utah statute by way of the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution and the binding effect of Supreme
Court decisions interpreting that Constitution.
I t is reasonable to assume that the Utah courts
will recognize this supremacy and hold or instruct a jury in any prosecution under the
statute according to the obscenity test enunciated in Memoirs,, Similar conclusions have
been reached in respect to other state stautes
(emphasis added)." Id. at 148.
It is noteworthy that appellants cite no authority
for their bald and unreasonable assedion that Utah's
statute is constitutionally infirm because it only says
that to be pornographic, material must "go substantially
beyond customary limits of candor" instead of saying,
as does Miller, the material must be "patently offensive."
Assuming there is a difference between these two foramDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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lations, the Supremacy Clause clearly supplies whatever
might be absent in Utah's formulation.
Moreover, quite independent of the effect of the
Supremacy Clause, this Court has a duty to construe the
words "go beyond the customary limits of candors "in
such a way as to avoid unconstitutionality^ if reasonable
to do so. It is eminently reasonable to construe those
words to be synonymous with the words "patently offensive." This is precisely what was done by the state courts
which decided the cases numbered 2 and 4, above.
2. The Utah Statute Protects Materials Which
Have "Serious Literary, Artistic, Political
or Scientific Value" Independent of the
Supremacy Clause.
The third element of the test in Miller is apparently
designed to protect against the prosecution of materials
which, though dealing with sex, nudity and excretion
have some serious pedogogical or otherwise justifiable
purpose. The words used in Miller are "serious literary,
artistic, political or scienitific value". Utah also provides
distributors of materials with the same protection, quite
independent of the Supremacy Clause:
"The following shall be affirmative defenses to
prosecution under this chapter:
That the distribution of pornographic material
was restricted to institutions or persons having
scientific, educational, governmental, or other
similar justification for possessing pornogra-
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phic material: . . . " Utah Code Annotated
(1953) § 76-10-1208(1) (1973 Supp.).
Thus, the Utah Statute does precisely what Miller re*
quires; it protects works of value.
Appellants may argue that the third element of the
Miller test was never designed to be an affirmative defense, and that only if the statute requires the prosecution to prove lack of serious value will it pass constitutional attack. But even assuming, arguendo, this to be
true, this court is free to hold that the burden of proving
that a work lacks serious literary, ets. value lies with the
prosecution, notwithstanding § 76-10-1208(1) is denominated an "affirmaitive defense" by the drafters of the
statute. Such would be an acceptable "authoritative
o)n&ti!iction" in pursuance of the court's duty to uphold
the statute's constitutionality when reasonable to do so.
Not only does logic thus allow this court to uphold
the Utah Statute as meeting the third test of Miller,
quite independent of the Supremacy Clause, but the Oregon Statute, which the court in Miller expressly approves,* can only pass the third part of the Miller test
if a court construes the language found in that statute's
affirmative defenses so as to meet that part of the test.
Moreover, the language found in Oregon's affirmative
defenses are not nearly as similar to the wording in Miller
as that found in § 76-10-1208(1) of the Utah statute;
those Oregon defenses are:
*Miller v. California, Id, at 2615, note 6.
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§ 167.085 "In any prosecution under ORS
167.065 to 167.080, it is an affirmative defense
for the defendant to prove:
(1) That the defendant was in a parental or
guardianship relationship with the minor; or
(2) That the defendant was a bona fide
school, museum or public library, or was acting in the course of his employment as an employee of such organization or of a retail outlet affiliated with and serving the educational
purpose of such organization; or
(3) That the defendant was charged with the
sale, showing, exhibition or display of an item,
those portions of which might otherwise be
contraband forming merely an incidental part
of an otherwise nonoffending whole, and serving some legitimate purpose therein other than
titillation.
(4) That the defendant had reasonable cause
to believe that the person involved was not a
minor."
§ 167.095 "In any prosecution for violation
of ORS 167.090, it shall be an affirmative defense for the defendant to prove:
(1) That the public display, even though in
connection with a commercial venture, was primarily for artistic purposes or as a public service; or
(2) That the public display was of nudity,
exhibited by a bona fide art, antique, or similar
gallery or exhibition, and visible in a normal
display setting."
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Not to be forgotten, according to the reasoning of
the three judge court in Gordon, supra, is that the "serious literary, etc, value" test would have to be read into
Utah's statute by virtue of the Supremacy Clause.
C. Utah's Statute Is Not Rendered Void By
Article Z, Section 15 Of The Utah Constitution.
Appellants nakedly assert that the Utah Statute violates Article I, Section 15 of the Utah Constitution, which
reads:
"No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain
the freedom of speech. . . ."
They cite no authority for relying on the Utah Constitution independently of the First Amendment. Research
discloses no authority for the proposition that Article I,
Section 15 affords protection to a greater scope of activities than the First Amendment.* Indeed, this court in
State v. Musser, 110 Utah 534, 546, 175 P. 2d 725 (1946),
quoted with approval from Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S.
652, 45 S. Ct. 625, 630 the following:
"That a State in the exercise of its police
power may punish those who abuse this freedom by utterances inimical to the public welfare, tending to corrupt public morals, incite
*The First Amendment has been repeatedly held to apply to
the states by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is felt unnecessary herein to advance the thesis as to the Fourteenth
Amendment set forth in Dyett v. Turner, 20 Ut. 2d 403.
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to crime, or disturb the public peace, is not
open to question."
This court is free to, and should follow Roth in holding
tihait pornography, having no social value, is not speech
and therefore is entitled to no constitutional protection
by virtue of Article I, Section 15. Further, this court
should isolate pornography from constitutionally protected speech in a way no less encroaching upon the
rights of society in the quality of life and to prevent criminal behavior* than was done in Miller.
D. This Court Should Affirm The Decisions Of
The Two Lower Courts.
The trial court in the case at hand had little difficulty in affirming the constitutionality of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-10-1203 (Supp. 1973). The Court held that
the requisite specificity could be supplied by authoritative
construction as suggested by Miller (R-15). "Nudity"
and "sex" were said to be defined by Utah Code Ann.
*The rationale of the United States Supreme Court was
enunciated in one of the six companion cases to Miller as follows:
". . . we hold that there are legitimate state interests at
stake in stemming the tide of commercialized obscenity . . .
These include the interest of the public in the quality of life
and total community environment, the tone of commerce in
the great city centers, and, possibly the public safety itself.
The Hill-Link Minority Keport of the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography indicates that there is at least an
arguable correlation between obscene material and crime."
Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 93 S.Ct. 2628,
2635 (1973).
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§ 1202 (Supp. 1973). Thus there was no question, but
that the publications in the case at hand Pole and Hole,
Climax, and Love Thirsty, fell within the aforenimtioned
definitions.
When the action was appealed to the Second District
Court, Weber County, the Court held (R-49) that the
obscenity statute satisfied constitutional standards as follows:
"Under Miller, and related decisions, State
Courts have not only the power but the duty to
construe State pornography legislation and so
to construe it as to avoid a constitutional confrontation if at all possible. The terms "sex",
"nudity", and "excretion" have common meaning and understanding in the English Language and give notice to all who understand
that language. If a more specific definition may
be helpful or necessary such specificity can be
supplied by judicial construction as per Miller
and such construction need not precede prosecution as long as the original statute is not so
overboard or vague as not to be understandable. . . .
The Court therefore holds the statute constitutional. . . ."
CONCLUSION
This Court should authoritatively construe the wrods
"nudity and sex" according to their commonly understood meanings, as has been done in New York, OaliDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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fornia, Virginia, Georgia and Kentucky (see cases nos.
(1) through (5), above) so as to proscribe the hard-core
pornography defined by Miller and involved in this case.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for
Plaintiff-Respondent
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